The glorious cause, p.44
The Glorious Cause, page 44
Washington, of course, badly wanted to discover Howe’s intentions. The immediate problems of his army now demanded attention, if so disorganized and dispirited a force could be called an army. The soldiers may have been impressed by their general’s ability to rescue them from disaster, but they gave no evidence of rallying themselves for the next fight. The militia proved particularly unreliable, as Washington expected, deserting almost by regiments. Their going affected the Continentals, whose discipline in September could not have been much better. There was the usual rambling about the American camp, soldiers coming and mostly going. As usual, supplies of everything were short, and partly as a result sickness increased. A defeated army almost always has a higher rate of sickness than a victorious one.
Washington and his officers resorted to familiar techniques to pull the regiments up to some sort of standard. Exhortation always failed but it was tried, and more direct means too—courts-martial and whipping. No regular routine of training on a day-to-day basis seems to have been observed in the regiments, then or ever in 1776. But in order to stop the constant traffic that disturbed the camps and the lines, Washington ordered frequent musters to be held, and begged for returns, which would give him some idea of the number of troops he had. Low morale, lack of discipline and organization, shortages of every sort were immediate problems and persistent ones as well. Most pressing of all problems was deciding what to do. Should the American army attempt to defend New York City, or should it pull out and burn the city as Nathanael Greene urged?21
Congress soon gave Washington instructions on this last matter—he must not destroy the city should he decide to leave it. The Congress disabused Washington of the notion that it was requiring him to defend the city, a dangerous idea that he had harbored all summer. Freed of this “requirement,” Washington began to consider evacuation of Manhattan while he could still escape. A council of his officers urged him to move to the north, at least as far as Kingsbridge, where the Harlem River emptied into the Hudson. The army began sending out its stores and the sick that day, and the troops began preparations for the withdrawal, which promised to be difficult to manage, for they were stretched out on a line from the southern tip of the island sixteen miles to the north.22
Howe meanwhile had decided to avoid the southern end of Manhattan in favor of landing where his enemy was not so heavily concentrated and, in effect, to outflank Washington once more. On September 13 he alerted his troops, reminding them that they had smashed the Americans on Long Island and recommending, as a British officer noted in his diary, “an entire dependence upon their bayonets, with which they will ever command that success which their bravery so well deserves.”23 This appeal suited the professional character of Howe’s troops—no evocation of the “sacred cause” here, nor any reference to the blessings of liberty, but simply look to your bayonets and behave bravely as British soldiers should.
To be successful the landing at Kip’s Bay depended on more than bayonets. Admiral Howe put five ships up the East River about 200 yards offshore. Around eleven in the morning, they opened up with broadsides in order to—in Washington’s phrase—“scour the Grounds and cover the landing of their Troops.” Scour the ground they did, battering down the thin line of earthworks—hardly more than a few ditches—and causing the militia, which had not come under heavy fire before, to take to its heels. Barges carried troops from Long Island about an hour later; they landed unopposed and by late afternoon were all ashore. Long before most of these troops stepped on land, the remnants of opposition had been broken, and Washington himself, who had ridden from Harlem to Kip’s Bay when he heard the ships open up, had almost been captured. As Washington approached the bay he ran into the flight of the militia, most of them from a Connecticut brigade commanded by Captain William Douglas. Appalled at what he saw, Washington lost that firm control of himself that everyone admired, and took to flogging officers and men with his riding cane. In his rage he threw his hat to the ground and was heedless of the approaching British. An aide finally grabbed the bridle of his horse and led him out of danger.24
The remnants of the army to the south in the city escaped too, as good luck, the determination of several leaders—or rather the guts of Israel Putnam—and a return of Howe’s lethargy pulled them through. Israel Putnam, at his best in a disaster, helped lead and drive the militia up the west side of the island along little-traveled roads. Young Aaron Burr served as guide for several detachments. Putnam rode up and down the west side near the Hudson, hurrying, cajoling, and organizing the retreat. Most stores and the heavy artillery of Knox were abandoned as the troops fled, hoping they would not be cut off by Howe’s light infantry. Howe considerately stayed on the east side, though he did send columns left and right, south and north, along the Post Road, the main highway on Manhattan. These soldiers soon entered the city, seizing stores and untended artillery. The column that moved up the Post Road paralleled the disorganized militia on the other side of the island for a time. But Howe did not push across, and by nightfall the Americans were on the high ground called Harlem Heights, their left flank on the Harlem River and their right on the Hudson.
The next day British carelessness and contempt for their enemy produced the battle of Harlem Heights, hardly more than a skirmish between several hundred light infantry and Colonel Thomas Knowlton’s Connecticut regiment just forward of the American line. As Frederick Mackenzie confided to his Diary, the light infantry pursued the Americans without “proper precautions or support” and blundered into an unfavorable position “and were rather severely handled by them.” The “victory” gave American soldiers a shred of confidence but at the cost of Knowlton’s life, and Knowlton was one of the best regimental commanders in the army.25
IV
The next two months, until Cornwallis captured Fort Lee on the west bank of the Hudson on November 20, saw Washington’s army fall back from one post to another. And in the three weeks that followed the flight from Fort Lee until December 7, 1776, when the Americans crossed the Delaware River from Trenton into Pennsylvania, the army was in full retreat, running desperately to avoid Cornwallis. For most of this period before Fort Lee fell, Washington proved indecisive and at times inept. The indecisiveness is easily understood: he did not know what Howe’s plans were—would Howe strike through the highlands into southern New England? Or would he head through New Jersey toward Philadelphia? Washington’s peculiar ineptness did not mar the disposition, the training, or even the leading of troops; rather it affected his dealings with his commanders, especially General Charles Lee.
On the surface at least, something approaching stagnation overtook the two armies on Harlem Heights after the battle of September 16. The Americans dug further into the ground, improved their lines, and tried to reorganize their forces. The British did some of the same though not at the frantic pace of their enemy. Below the surface, Washington was active, trying in particular to hold his forces together and—most intrusive of all his problems—recruiting in anticipation of the virtual dissolution of his army when enlistments expired in November and December. Shortly after the battle of Long Island the Congress had authorized recruitments up to 80,000 men, a well-timed and immensely heartening decision, but what the Congress gave, it—like the Lord—would take away. In this case the Congress did not so much take away as make rapid enlistment of troops impossible by requiring that state legislatures appoint committees which would then select the regimental officers who would do the actual recruiting. The state legislatures acted slowly, or rather did nothing at all for several months, and the authorized regiments went unfilled while Washington begged for soldiers.26
As engrossing as these problems were, Howe relieved Washington’s mind of them at least temporarily on October 12, when he broke the early autumn quiet by putting 4000 men ashore on Throg’s Neck. The neck, variously called Frog’s Neck or Frog’s Point, was sometimes a peninsula and sometimes an island, depending upon tide action and freshwater drainage, and extended into Long Island Sound almost due east of the American lines. The Royal Navy carried soldiers through Hell Gate in the fog; their landing was unopposed. But getting off Throg’s Neck was no easy matter because American detachments guarded the exits—several fords and a small causeway over a creek.27
Although Howe seemed bottled up, he had outflanked the American army on Harlem Heights. Four days later Washington decided to move north to White Plains, a day-long march, and on October 18 he began pulling his forces off the Heights. Because of the shortage of horses and wagons this movement occupied four days, with the troops themselves pulling the artillery. Howe accommodatingly left the Americans unmolested, though on the day they began their move he embarked his force once more and landed farther up the Sound on Pell’s Point. A small American brigade under Colonel John Glover gave the Hessian advance party a short fight, but Howe’s men soon took the Point without difficulty.
The British did not make their way to White Plains for another ten days, where on October 28 they assaulted and captured Chatterton’s Hill on the extreme right of the American lines. Three days later Washington pulled his army back to North Castle and a new line of entrenchments. Howe followed as far as the old lines, but during the night of November 4 he withdrew—Washington erroneously called the move a “retreat”—and ten days later Howe was in position around Fort Washington on the east side of the Hudson below Kingsbridge.28
During these ten days Washington speculated on Howe’s intentions and prepared to pull a part of his army out of North Castle for service in New Jersey. There did not seem to be much doubt that Howe would attempt to capture Fort Washington, but that would not satisfy him. In studying Howe’s behavior, Washington projected one of his own values into Howe’s mind—a concern for reputation. Washington was always affected by what others thought of him. That he believed that the enemy was moved by a similar concern was clear in the rhetorical question he asked about Howe: “He must attempt something on Account of his Reputation, for what has he done yet, with his great Army?” Howe’s immediate objective seemed obvious: to invest Fort Washington, but, if he succeeded, what next? Perhaps he would move to the southern colonies, and perhaps he would drive through New Jersey for Philadelphia, where the Congress held forth. For the moment, Fort Washington seemed to be the obvious objective. “Could the Americans hold it?” was a question soon translated into another: Was holding it necessary or worthwhile after British warships forced their way through the obstructions in the Hudson between Fort Washington and Fort Lee on the west bank? The American guns in these forts had fired on the warships making their way up the Hudson but with little effect beyond minor damage to rigging and sails.29
As soon as the British proved that the two forts could not stop their ships, Washington began to think of evacuating Fort Washington. It seemed prudent not to risk the 3000 troops there, especially since Howe’s force outnumbered them three or four to one. But Washington was not on the scene, and the commander of the area, Nathanael Greene, and his subordinate, Colonel Robert Magaw, who led the garrison inside the fort, believed they could hold out. Washington expressed his doubts to Greene in a letter written on November 8, 1776, but hung back from giving a direct order. He did not wish “to hazard the men and Stores at Mount Washington, but as you are on the Spot, leave it to you to give such Orders as to evacuating Mount Washington as you Judge best and so far revoking the Order given Colonel Magaw to defend it to the last.”30
Being on the scene or “on the Spot” described a most desirable condition in Washington’s mind. He was not a commander who trusted abstractions, nor did he ever wish to make decisions at a distance. He wanted to see things for himself and did so: at Cambridge, he reconnoitered the lines and inspected camps; on Long Island he did not order a withdrawal until he could supervise it himself; he raced to Kip’s Bay to see the disaster with his own eyes; and he got as near the battle of Harlem Heights as he prudently could. He had the imagination to be a map general but not the inclination. He could hold a representation of troop dispositions and a battlefield in his head, but he preferred to be on the spot. One of the skills he acquired as a young man was the art of surveying, an art that required its practitioners to pace the ground. He was a planter and a land speculator, with a feel for the earth, for terrain. Though he could reason from a distance, he wanted the evidence his senses provided before bringing his judgment to bear.
Washington did not arrive on the scene until just before the British moved on Fort Washington, and when he got there he found Nathanael Greene, an attractive, confident personality and an able and articulate man who said the place could be defended. Of course Greene had not fought a major battle—he won his spurs as a tactician after this disaster—but he was obviously bright and he was self-assured, and presumably he had earned the right to predict from being on the ground.31
Greene had the right to make a prediction, but there was no good reason to trust him. Washington, however, did trust him—in defiance of his own instincts, whose promptings were confirmed by a visual inspection on November 14. At the decisive moment, a strong, steady personality allowed itself to be swayed by the enthusiasm of a more youthful, exuberant, and optimistic one.
On November 16, Howe destroyed Greene’s illusions and confirmed Washington’s fears. The British moved into position the day before around the American lines. These lines, about five miles on a side, were much too far from the fort itself, which consisted of breastworks on the Heights of Washington, 230 feet above the Hudson. Howe demanded the surrender of the fort, and Magaw refused in a grand response which soon sounded absurd: “Give me leave to assure his Excellency that activated by the most glorious cause that mankind ever fought in, I am determined to defend this post to the last extremity.”32 The next day General Percy struck Lt. Colonel Lambert Cadwalader’s Pennsylvanians from the south, General Edward Mathews, Cornwallis in reserve, pressed against Colonel Baxter’s militia from the east, and General Wilhelm von Knyphausen drove against Lt. Colonel Moses Rawlings’s Maryland and Virginia regiments. Knyphausen’s Hessians took heavy losses from the Marylanders and the Virginians, but in three hours the lines on all three sides had collapsed. Compressed into the fort, disorganized, and near panic, the Americans could not have held out long. They did not offer more resistance, and Magaw surrendered them that afternoon. British dead were numerous—almost 300—but the total American casualties were far heavier—54 killed, 100 wounded, and 2858 captured. Valuable stores, artillery, and ammunition were also taken.33
Four days later, on the morning of November 20, Cornwallis took 4000 regulars across the Hudson, landing at Closter, New Jersey, about six miles above Fort Lee. His objective was the American army in New Jersey, which was divided between Hackensack and Fort Lee. Washington had taken 2000 men across the Hudson at Peekskill on November 9 and 10, leaving General Heath at Peekskill with around 3200 troops guarding the approaches to southern New England; Charles Lee and 5500 men remained at North Castle. To complete the sweep of the Hudson River forts, Cornwallis marched quickly to the south and almost trapped the garrison at Fort Lee. Failing to squeeze Greene and Washington between the Hackensack and Hudson rivers, he delayed pursuit for another week.34
Washington and a disorganized and dispirited force of 3000 marched and straggled from Hackensack on November 21. They made it to Newark the next day and rested for the following five days. Late that week Cornwallis set his troops in motion; his advance party reached the town on November 28 just as Washington’s rear guard cleared out. The Americans reached New Brunswick on November 29, and a day later bade farewell to 2000 militiamen from New Jersey and Maryland whose enlistments expired. These men had stood all they cared to; they were going home. Cornwallis was in full pursuit now and moving as fast as he could over muddy roads, his pace slowed somewhat by rain and cold weather. He almost caught Washington a second time, at New Brunswick, December 1, but was stopped there by Howe’s order. Washington’s men had chopped down the timbers supporting the bridge over the Raritan in any case. Still, Cornwallis was criticized at the time, and ever since, for not pushing on, though his men were exhausted and he had his orders.35
Washington’s command reached Trenton on the Delaware River on December 3; Howe, who had joined Cornwallis at New Brunswick, resumed the pursuit three days later and almost caught the Americans at Princeton on the 7th. The next day at midmorning the British moved out. When they got to Trenton, they found the river full of water and empty of boats. Washington had crossed, taking them all with him and ordering all that could be found up and down the river destroyed or floated to the west bank.36
Howe hovered along the Delaware for a week, his patrols looking for boats. He may have considered building a number sufficient to ferry his army across but did not pursue the possibility. On December 14 he ordered his troops into winter quarters, the weather having turned bitterly cold and no opportunity of closing with his enemy presenting itself. Most of the British regiments marched to more comfortable quarters in New York City and Howe himself went with them. Cornwallis received permission to return to England; Clinton, who by this time thoroughly despised Howe, sulked in Newport. To the Hessians went the honor and the duty of manning the outpost line along the Delaware.
